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Abstract. This paper proposes a simulation for research behaviour, fo-
cusing on the process of writing papers, submitting them to journals and
conferences, reviewing them, and accepting/rejecting them. The simu-
lation is currently used to evaluate the OpinioNet reputation model,
which calculates the reputation of researchers and research work based
on inferred opinions. The goal is to verify whether the reputation model
succeeds in encouraging ‘good’ research behaviour or no, although the
simulator is elaborate enough to be used for the analysis of other aspects
of paper writing, submission, and review processes.
1 Introduction
The classical way in which scientific publications are produced, evaluated and
credited, is being challenged by the use of modern computer science technolo-
gies [1, 5]. In particular, software versioning tools and reputation mechanisms
make it realistic to think about a publication process where the publications
are ‘liquid’, in the sense that they are persistently accessible over Internet and
modified along time. Credit is then given to authors based on opinions, reviews,
comments, etc. This would produce many beneficial results, for instance, to re-
duce the current large number of very similar publications (i.e. salami papers)
or to organise conferences by just searching for the most prestigious liquid pub-
lications satisfying certain keywords. OpinioNet [4] is one reputation model that
has been proposed with the intent of encouraging ‘good’ research behaviour. For
instance, its equations are designed to give more attention to the quality of a
researcher’s work than their quantity.
This paper proposes a simulator that would simulate the course of scientific
publications, from writing papers and submitting them to journals and confer-
ences to reviewing them and accepting/rejecting them. The main goal of the
simulator is to verify whether the OpinioNet reputation model succeeds in en-
couraging ‘good’ research behaviour or not, although the simulator is rich enough
to be used for the analysis of other aspects of paper writing, submission, and
review processes.
The rest of this paper is divided as follows. Section 2 provides the background
needed for understanding the followed formal publications model and the Opin-
ioNet reputation model being evaluated. Section 3 introduces the basics of the
simulator. The simulator’s algorithm is then presented by Section 4, and its as-
sumptions and hypothesis are presented by Section 5. Section 6 then discusses
the preliminary results, before concluding with Section 7.
2 Background
Reputation is widely understood as the group’s opinion about the entity in
question. The OpinioNet reputation model [4] is based on the concept that in
the case of the lack of explicit opinions, opinions may be deduced from related
entities. For instance, in the field of publications, one may assume that if a
paper has been accepted by a reputable conference, then the paper should be
of a minimum quality. Similarly, a conference becomes reputable if it accepts
high quality papers. OpinioNet is essentially based on this notion of opinion
propagation in structural graphs, such as the publications graphs (where nodes
of this graph may represent knowledge objects, such as conference proceedings
and conference papers, and relations stating which is part of what).
OpinioNet understands opinions as probability distributions over an evalu-
ation space, for a particular attribute, and at a moment in time; for example,
one can define a set of elements for the evaluation space for quality of a node as
{poor, good, v.good, excellent}. The set of attributes that opinions may address
can be, for instance, {novelty, clarity, significance, correctness}. OpinioNet then
defines the structural graph accordingly: SG = 〈N, G, O, E, A, T, E , F〉, where
N is the set of nodes, G is the set of agents that may generate opinions about
nodes, O is the set of all opinions, E is the ordered evaluation space for O, A
is the set of attributes that opinions may address, T represents calendar time,
E ⊆ N ×N specifies which nodes are part of the structure of which others (i.e.
(n, n′) ∈ E implies n is part of n′), F : G × N × A × T → O is a relation that
links a given agent, node, attribute, and time to their corresponding opinion.
A single opinion is then represented as the probability distribution
P(E|G,N,A, T ) ∈ O. We note that probability distributions subsume classical
approaches and are more informative. Hence, the adoption of this approach by
our simulator does not necessarily restrict its application to other scenarios.
3 Simulation Basics
In theory, it is researchers’ behaviour (defined through their profiles) that would
influence the creation and evolution of papers, journals, and, eventually, fields
of research. However, to keep the simulation simple, our example focuses on the
evolution of one specific aspect of a research community—namely, the growth of
the community’s contributions—and neglects other aspects that are not deemed
crucial for the evaluation of the reputation module—such as the rise and fall of
the community itself, its journals, its fields of research, etc. As such, and for the
sake of simplifying the simulation, we choose to simulate a single community
with a fixed number of researchers researching a given subject; we say it is
the researchers’ profiles that control the production and dissemination of single
contributions; and we keep the number of journals that could accept/reject these
contributions fixed. In other words, we say one ‘top rated’ journal is sufficient
to represent the acceptance of a contribution by any ‘top rated’ journal. We
argue that since our current interest is in the future of authors’ contributions
(such as papers or book chapters), the number of journals becomes irrelevant:
what is crucial is the quality of the journals (if any) that accept the authors’
contributions. In what follows, we define the simulator’s input and output.
3.1 The Simulator’s Input and Output
The simulator requires the following tuple as input: 〈SG0, J, U,J ,U ,T〉, where
SG0 describes the initial state of the system (or the initial SG graph), which
should include at least a fixed number of researchers and journals; J describes the
set of journal profiles (defined shortly); U describes the set of researcher profiles
(defined shortly); J ⊆ N × J is a function that maps a journal in N (where N
is the set of knowledge objects in SG0) to a journal profile in J ; U ⊆ G×U is a
function that maps a researcher in G (where G is the set of researchers in SG0)
to a researcher profile in U ; and T ∈ N∗ describes the number of years to be
simulated. Then, every simulation year Y results in a modified structural graph
SGY . The evolution of the SG graph is then presented: ESG = {SG0, · · · , SGT}.
3.2 Journals’ Profiles
Journals are categorised through profiles that define their quality and their re-
quired number of reviewers. A journal’s profile j ∈ J is defined as the tuple:
j = 〈J,RN〉, where similar to the opinions on quality, J is a probability distri-
bution over the evaluation space E describing the quality of the journal; and RN
describes the number of reviewers needed to review a paper, and it is specified
as a Gaussian function over the set of natural numbers N.
The rules for accepting/rejecting contributions depends on the quality of the
journal J. For example, very good journals are very strict about the quality of the
papers they accept, other lower quality ones are not as strict. Hence, a journal’s
acceptance threshold AT may be defined in terms of its quality J. A preliminary
definition could be to have AT= emd(J,T), where emd is the earth movers
distance that calculates the distance (whose range is [0, 1], where 0 represents
the minimum distance and 1 represents the maximum possible distance) between
two probability distributions [6],1 and T= {en 7→ 1} (where ∀ei ∈ E · en > ei)
describes the ideal distribution, or the best distribution possible.
3.3 Researchers’ Profiles
Similar to journals, researchers’ behaviour is also categorised through profiles
that define their quality, their productivity, etc. A researcher’s profile u ∈ U is
defined as the tuple: u = 〈Q,RP,CN,C,CA,CP,SC,V,SS,RvP,RV,RT〉,
where
1 If probability distributions are viewed as piles of dirt, then the earth mover’s distance
measures the minimum cost for transforming one pile into the other. This cost is
equivalent to the ‘amount of dirt’ times the distance by which it is moved, or the
distance between elements of the ordered evaluation space E.
– Q describes the researcher’s research quality, and it is specified as a proba-
bility distribution over the evaluation space E (we assume that researchers
have a fixed and ‘intrinsic’ quality of research — Section 5 argues the need for
this intrinsic value — which is different from reputation values that reflect
the view of the community and are calculated by reputation algorithms);
– RP describes the research productivity in terms of the produced number of
papers per year (since produced research work is usually presented and pre-
served through papers, whether published or unpublished), and it is specified
as a Gaussian function over the set of natural numbers N;
– CN describes the researcher’s usual number of coauthors per contribution,
and it is specified as a Gaussian function over the set of natural numbers N;
– C describes the accepted research quality of coauthors, and it is specified as
a probability distribution over the evaluation space E;
– CA describes the accepted affinity level of coauthors (currently, affinity mea-
sure describes how close are two researchers’ profiles; however, in future sim-
ulations, one may also consider affinity measures that describe how close are
two researchers with respect to numerous social relations), and the range of
its value is the interval [0, 1], where the value 0 represents minimum affinity
and the value 1 represents maximum affinity;
– CP describes the level of persistency in sticking with old coauthors, it is
defined in terms of the number of past papers that two researchers have
coauthored together, and it is specified as a Gaussian function over the set
of natural numbers N;
– SS describes the submission strategy of the researcher, and the range of
its value is the interval [−1,+1], where a value −1 represents an extreme
‘risk-averse’ strategy in which the researcher does not submit a paper to
any journal unless its paper is of the highest quality possible, a value of +1
represents an extreme ‘risk-seeking’ strategy in which the researcher doesn’t
mind submitting a paper to a journal of much higher quality, and the value
0 represents a more neutral approach in which the researcher usually sub-
mits its papers to journals of the same quality (of course, values in between
represent different levels of risk-averse and risk-seeking strategies);2
– RvP describes the researcher’s review productivity in terms of the number
of papers the researcher accepts to review per year, and it is specified as a
Gaussian function over the set of natural numbers N;
– RV describes the review quality in terms of how close the researcher’s reviews
are from the true quality of the papers in question, it is defined in terms of
the distance from the true quality of the paper in question, and the range of
this distance is the interval [−1,+1]; and
– RT describes the reviewers’ threshold for accepting to review a paper for a
given journal, it is defined in terms of the earth mover’s distance between
2 We assume that the quality of journals and that of researchers may be compared
since they are measured on the same scale. Our assumption is based on the idea that
the quality of the researchers, their papers, and the journals that accept those papers
are all based on the quality of the research work being carried out and presented.
the reviewer’s quality of research and that of the journal’s, and the range of
its value is the interval [0, 1].
We note that although the researchers’ profiles may seem too complex, (1)
many ideas have already been overly simplified, as illustrated by Section 5.1,
and (2) additional simplifications are straightforward.
4 Simulation Algorithm
While the previous section has introduced the simulator as a black box, this
section presents an overview of the simulation algorithm. (For the simulator’s
technical details, we refer the interested reader to our technical document [3].)
The algorithm’s steps are outlined below.
1. Generate the groups of coauthors for the given year
The idea is that each group of coauthors will produce one paper that will
then be added to the SG graph. In summary, the algorithm selects the
authors one by one, giving the authors that intend to write more papers
this year (specified by the research productivity RP of the researcher) a
higher probability of being selected first. Then, for each selected author, the
algorithm searches, in an iterated manner, for a suitable group of coauthors,
where the ‘suitability’ is based on the restrictions imposed by each researcher
through its preferred number of coauthors (CN), the accepted quality of
coauthors (C), the accepted affinity of coauthors (CA), and the accepted
persistency of coauthors (CP)). The algorithm iterates until all researchers
are assigned to as many coalitions as needed.
2. Then, for each paper resulting from a created group of coauthors, the simu-
lator performs the following:
(a) Calculate the intrinsic quality of the paper
We base our simulation on the idea that papers have a true quality
that researchers (and reviewers) often try to guess. Of course, in reality,
this value does not exist. However, simulation may assume such values
to compare and analyse the performance of researchers. We assume that
when researchers from various qualities (where a researcher’s true quality
is specified by the parameter Q) are grouped together then the resulting
paper’s true value would be an aggregation of the researchers’ true value.
(b) Choose the journal to submit the paper to
After a paper is created, it is submitted to some journal. The selection
of the journal assumes that researchers tend to have certain submis-
sion strategies (specified through the parameter SS), and the submission
strategy for a given journal is an aggregation of its authors’.3 The final
3 Although, in fields that are known to have an enormous number of authors per
paper (for example, it is not uncommon for Physics articles to have a few thousand
authors each) and by the law of large numbers, the simple aggregation method of
the authors’ SS values would fail since it would result in similar values for all papers.
In such cases, it might be useful to calculate the resulting submission strategy by
adopting it from the leading author.
calculated submission strategy is then used to help select the journal to
submit to by enforcing constraints on the distance between the paper’s
true quality (calculated by step 2(a) above) and that of the journal’s (J).
(c) Choose the reviewers to review the paper
This action is based on the number of reviews needed RN, the availabil-
ity of the reviewers (researchers are assumed to review a certain number
of papers per year, determined by RvP, and they accept the journals’
requests to review papers based on a first come first serve basis), the qual-
ity of the researcher Q, the quality of the journal J, and the reviewer’s
threshold for accepting a journal (RT).
(d) Generate the reviewers’ opinions (reviews) about the paper in question
Reviewers’ opinions are based on the intrinsic quality of the paper (cal-
culated by step 2.(a).) and the researcher’s review quality (RV), which
determines how close the review would be to the paper’s true value.
(e) Accept/Reject the paper by the chosen journal
This calculation is based on the quality of the journal J, the journal’s ac-
ceptance threshold (AT), and the reviewers’ aggregated opinions, where
the aggregation take into consideration the reviewers’ reputation at the
time. Note that if the paper is accepted, then it is linked (in the SG
graph) to the journal through the part of relation.
(f) Reputation measures are calculated by OpinioNet
After reviews are created and papers are accepted/rejected accordingly,
the simulator calls the OpinioNet reputation model to calculate the rep-
utation of papers based on the new reviews and acceptance results, as
well as the authors’ reputation based on the reputation of their papers.
3. Repeat the entire process for the following year.
5 Assumptions and Hypotheses
After introducing the proposed simulation algorithm, and before moving on to
the experiments and results, this section is intended to clarify our stance by
highlighting and discussing the assumptions we make as well as clarifying the
claims the simulation algorithm is designed to test.
5.1 Assumptions
As discussed earlier, trying to simulate the real behaviour of researchers requires
a thorough study of various aspects, from how people choose their coauthors
and how they choose where to submit their work to, to how do journals select
reviewers, and how is the quality of a paper related to the research quality of
its authors. We argue that the proposed simulation algorithm is sophisticated
enough to capture the actions that have an impact on reputation measures, yet it
is simplified enough to overlook unnecessary complicated behaviour. As a result,
a bunch of assumptions are made, which we discuss below. We note that many
of the fixed values that we refer to in our assumptions are in fact either drawn
from a predefined Gaussian function, or some noise is added to them to make
our scenarios more realistic.
On the Static Nature of the Research Community. We say both the community
and the researchers’ behaviour are static: researchers do not join or leave the
community; journals do not evolve or die; the field of research is fixed; each
paper cites a fixed number of other papers; a researcher’s productivity does
not change with time; a researcher’s quality of research does not evolve with
time; a researcher’s review productivity does not evolve with time; a researcher’s
review quality does not evolve with time and his reviews always fall at a fixed
distance from that of the true quality of the paper being reviewed; a researcher’s
submission strategy does not evolve with time; a researcher’s acceptable journal
quality for reviewing papers is fixed; and journals do not evolve and they always
accept papers of the same quality.
These assumptions are introduced to keep the simulation simple. Although,
to keep the simulation more realistic, some randomness is introduced when gen-
erating the measures specifying a ‘fixed’ behaviour. We postpone the study of
dynamic and evolving behaviour for future work.
On Selecting Coauthors. Selecting the coauthors to collaborate with is usually a
complex matter that depends on a variety of issues, such as the subject of study,
the practicality of collaboration, and so on. Our proposed simulator, however, is
not aimed at studying the dynamics of human relations, their collaboration, and
coalition formations, but the production of papers on an annual basis. Hence,
for simplicity, the production of papers assumes researchers produce a fixed
number of papers per year, and coauthor their papers with a group of other
researchers. Again, for simplicity, we assume the strategy of selecting coauthors
is fixed and that coauthors are selected based on their quality, their affinity, and
their persistence. Of course, different weights may be given to each.
On the True Quality of Researchers and Research Work. Although in reality the
true quality of a researcher is neither definite nor accessible, we do assume that
researchers have defined true and fixed qualities, since we feel the need to base
several other actions on these qualities. For example, we say the true quality of a
paper is based on the true quality of its authors. And this is crucial because we
say, for instance, that how good a reviewer is depends on how close its opinion
is from the true quality of the paper in question.
But how is the true quality of the paper calculated? We argue that when re-
searchers from various qualities are grouped together then the resulting paper’s
true (quality) value would be an aggregation of the researchers’ true (quality)
value. However, we also assume that when the dispersion in quality is large
(where the Gini coefficient [2] is used to describe dispersion), the aggregation
tends to follow a mean nature; and when the dispersion in quality is low, the ag-
gregation tends to follow a more superadditive nature. The equation we propose
for calculating a paper’s true value X is then defined as follows:
X = G ·mean({Qa}) + (1−G) · superadd({Qa}) (1)
where, {Qa} represents the set of all authors’ true value Q, G represents the
Gini coefficient, mean represents some mean function, and superadd represents
some superadditive function.45
The superadditivity implies that when a group of researchers in the same
quality range are combined, then they may be able to produce some work that is
a little bit better than what each may produce on their own. However, when very
good researchers coauthor papers with very poor ones, then the poor ones could
possibly pull the quality of the produced paper below the excellent researcher’s
standard quality. In other words, the effect that a single researcher has on the
true quality of a paper is dependent on its quality of coauthors.
On Selecting the Journal to Submit a paper to. We say researchers have different,
and ‘fixed’, submission strategies. We define submission strategies following the
prospect theory classification of strategies into risk seeking, risk averse, and risk
neutral ones. The submission strategy of a paper is then an aggregation of its
authors’. For example, if the submission strategy is ‘risk seeking’, then the paper
may be submitted to some journal which is of better quality than the paper in
question. If the submission strategy is ‘risk averse’, then the paper cannot be
submitted to a journal unless it is of higher quality. Of course, varying levels of
these strategies are considered.
On Selecting the Reviewers. Journals usually try to get good reviewers, based
on availability. But how do reviewers choose whether to accept/reject reviewing
papers for a given journal. We assume that reviewers accept journals based on
a first come first serve basis, as long as the journal is of acceptable quality and
the reviewer is available to do more reviews.
On Accepting/Rejecting papers by a given Journal. We assume accepting/rejecting
a paper is only based on reviewers’ opinions, and not on the number of papers
submitted, the acceptance rate, etc. This is necessary because we have already
assumed the number of journals to be fixed. In other words, we say one journal of
a given quality is enough to represent all potential journals of that same quality.
Furthermore, when accepting/rejecting a paper, the journal’s editors do not
base their decision on the true quality of the paper (since this information is not
available), but on the aggregated reviewers’ opinions. When aggregating review-
ers’ opinions, we say that the reliability of a review (or opinion) is based on the
researcher’s current reputation in his/her community (as calculated by the Opin-
ioNet algorithm), rather than how confident it claims to be (which is how the
current review process works). We believe this is a stronger reliability measure
since the reviewer does not assess himself, but is assessed by the community.
4 We argue that it does not matter much which exact mean or superadditive functions
we choose, since the effect of that would be minute. In any case, we hope future
extensive simulations would clarify which choices are better.
5 It is not clear yet whether the proposed approach for calculating a paper’s true values
would provide better results than a simple variance of authors’ quality values. Future
extensive simulations could also clarify which choices are better.
On the Fate of Papers. Finally, we say that, for the sake of simplicity, both
accepted and rejected papers are forgotten. Neither of them is submitted to
other journals in the following years; only new papers are created each year. In
practice these new papers would in fact be a modification of (i.e. a new version
of) already existing ones. However, we currently postpone the simulation of
the version of relation that links related papers for future simulations. This
assumption is acceptable since the current simulation simply focuses on the
number of journals and the quality of the journals that accept them, rather than
the evolution of papers.
5.2 Hypotheses
The OpinioNet reputation model has been used in an attempt to encourage
‘good’ research behaviour [3]. The proposed simulator aims at verifying whether
OpinioNet achieves its goal or not through testing the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 It is more profitable to produce few high quality papers than sev-
eral lower quality ones.
Hypothesis 2 It is more profitable to follow a ‘risk-neutral’ submission strategy.
The first hypothesis implies that it would be more profitable, in terms of
reputation, to spend more time on producing few high quality research papers
than numerous papers of lower quality. This, we believe, lowers the dissemination
overhead in researchers’ contributions and encourages researchers to spend more
time on high quality research, as opposed to wasting time on repackaging already
existing ideas for the sole purpose of increasing reputation.
The second hypothesis implies that it is more profitable (again, in terms of
reputation) to submit one’s contributions to journals that lie in the same qual-
ity range of the paper. For instance, if authors choose journals that are much
better, then they end up wasting the community’s time and resources, and they
also waste time before their work is accepted. However, if the authors choose
journals that are of much lower quality than the work submitted, then they
miss the chance of having this work published in more reputable journals. Nat-
urally, proving/disproving this hypothesis will be influenced by the assumption
that papers may only be submitted once. We believe resubmitting usually re-
quires the creation of news versions, which we postpone for future (and more
advanced) simulations. Nevertheless, the current simulation may illustrate the
effort, time, and potential gain in reputation that could be wasted by preferring
one submission strategy over another.
To test the claims above, we define two different simulations, one for each
of these claims. In each of these simulations, we keep the value of the relevant
parameters in the researchers’ profiles fixed while we vary the other values. For
instance, the parameter describing the researcher’s productivity (RP) should
be fixed when testing the first hypothesis, while the parameter describing the
researcher’s submission strategy (SS) should be fixed for testing the second hy-
pothesis. The following section discussed the details of our simulation examples
and their results.
6 Results and Analysis
For our preliminary simulation, we choose to simulate a small research commu-
nity composed of a fixed set of 20 researchers. The simulation then runs for 10
time-steps, where each time-step represents one calendar year. In other words,
our simulated example represents a fixed community of 20 researchers with vary-
ing behaviour and its evolution over 10 years.
At each time-step, papers are added following the constraints of the various
profiles. With the addition of each paper, the following measures are calculated:
(1) the OpinioNet reputation of the papers affected by this addition, and (2) the
OpinioNet reputation of authors affected by this addition. The evolution of these
measures along time is then plotted for further analysis, as illustrated shortly.
Evaluating Hypothesis 1. In this experiment, we divide the researchers into 3
groups: (1) those with a high quality research and low productivity level, (2)
those with a medium quality research and a medium productivity level, and (3)
those with low quality research and a high productivity level. We note that the
productivity level represents the number of papers produced per year. All the
other values defining the researchers’ profiles are kept fixed. For example, all
researchers share the same criteria in selecting their co-authors.
The results are presented by Figure 1, which shows that those who focus
on the quantity cannot do better than those who focus on the quality of their
work. However, if we have two researchers that have the same quality of work,
then it is not very clear whether focusing on quantity would help or not. For
this reason, we run a second experiment, where all the researchers now share the
same quality of work, but have different productivity levels. Four categories of
productivity are distinguished: (1) those with very high productivity level per
year, (2) those with an average productivity level per year, (3) those with a very
low productivity level per year, and (4) those who produce a paper every several
years (around 5 years on average). The results of this experiment are presented
by Figure 2, which illustrates that as long as a researcher is producing papers
relatively ‘frequent’ enough, then s/he needs not focus on the quantity of their
papers. However, there is a limit for this ‘frequency’. For example, we show that
researchers who produce only one paper every 5 years cannot compete with those
who are continuously active.
These results confirm hypothesis 1, which states that it is more profitable to
produce few high quality papers than several low quality ones; yet, researchers are
required to remain active not become dormant for long periods of time.
Evaluating Hypothesis 2 In this experiment, we divide the researchers into 3
groups: (1) those with a ‘risk-seeking’ submission strategy, (2) those with a
‘risk-neutral’ submission strategy, and (3) those with ‘risk-averse’ submission
strategy. All the other values defining their profiles are kept fixed. For exam-
ple, all researchers are of a medium-high quality; all researchers share the same
criteria in selecting their co-authors, etc. The results of this experiment are pre-
sented by Figure 3, which shows that the researchers that are more picky in their
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selection of the journals to submit their papers to have their reputation fluctu-
ating much more than others. This is because they risk their work being rejected
by some journals, but when they do get published, their gain in reputation is
relatively high.
An intriguing issue to note is that all three groups tend to have a similar
reputation after a long period of time (10 years in this case). We believe that
this might be related to the quality of the researchers. For example, researchers
with a very high quality might be better off choosing a ‘risk-seeking’ submission
strategy than a ‘risk-averse’ one. We hope future simulations to clarify this issue.
7 Conclusion
This paper has presented a simulator that simulates the details of the publica-
tion process, from writing papers and submitting them to journals, to the review
process and the final decision of accepting/rejecting papers. The simulator is
rich enough to be used in analysing different aspects of the publication process.
However, this paper has focused on using it to verify the OpinioNet reputation
model’s success in encouraging ‘good’ behaviour, such as encouraging the focus
on the quality of work produced as opposed to its quantity. Future work should
help us understand the details and preconditions of hypotheses 1 and 2 better.
We also plan to extend our future simulations for testing additional hypotheses
such as: (1) Is it more profitable to collaborate with researchers of high research
quality? (2) Are more reputable researchers less susceptible to the selected qual-
ity of coauthors? (3) Is it more profitable to repackage one’s research work into
different versions? And so on.
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